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Abstract
This paper presents an overview of the results of NavTech, an architectural frame-
work to support the development of reliable large-scale applications. Several concrete
protocols designed under the NavTech framework were published along the years, but
most of the architectural innovations together with the skeleton protocols had remained
unpublished. We identify the fundamental building blocks and the relevant connections
among them that make it possible to support a wide range of applications. The archi-
tecture explicitly addresses the issues of scale by admitting clustering, and relying on a
hierarchical network model (a WAN-of-LANs). Besides, it features a novel membership
structure, based on the site-participant hierarchy. This membership skeleton supports in
turn a hierarchy of protocol building blocks. Inside each block, different algorithms can
be constructed by microprotocol composition, achieving different specializations of the
architecture. NavTech protocols further enjoy the topology awareness property, which
enhances their scalability.
1 Introduction
This paper reports the lessons and experience we gained in developing a framework called
NAVTECH , aimed at supporting open large-scale distributed applications with emphasis
on reliability and scalability. To put the subject in context, we claim that the fundamental
problems that arise when building these applications are architectural rather than algorith-
mic. If the underlying architecture has the right constructs, useful properties emerge and
help building efficient algorithms. Indeed we published a number of algorithms and proto-
cols that took advantage of one such property, topology-awareness. In [39] a complete survey
of the former can be found. However, most of the architectural innovations introduced by
NAVTECH , together with its membership and failure detection skeleton protocols, had re-
mained unpublished. The objective of this paper is to report these concepts, and the lessons
we learned, in a comprehensive way.
When designing any form of support system for distributed applications, there is always
a tradeoff between generality and performance. Generic approaches make few assumptions
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about the underlying architecture and network. The resulting middleware and communi-
cation protocols are easy to port to different settings, but often exhibit poor performance
and lack the ability to exploit advantages of the infrastructure. On the other hand, tailored
solutions exploit particular features of given networks, or given host architectures, in order
to achieve better performance. However, tailoring has its disadvantages: if the features ex-
ploited are peculiar only to one or two networks or host architectures, it may be difficult— or
not rewarding— to port the resulting protocols to other settings that do not own these char-
acteristics. The successful design must capture the right balance between generality and
performance. If we focus our attention on the design of large-scale systems, this balance
becomes a very delicate one. Firstly, because the opportunity for heterogeneity increases
with the size and openess of the system. Secondly, because the large distances and numbers
of participants involved welcome all efforts that can be made to gain in performance and
scalability.
The NAVTECH architectural constructs aim at solving a few fundamental problems related
with host and network architecture: the fact that network topology and hierarchy are most
of the times concealed; the often neglected duality between processes and processors or,
in our terminology, participants and sites. The functional aspects of the NAVTECH model
are based on a few architectural paradigms, which address the scale issues just discussed
and put in place a few hooks for topology awareness: 2-tier networking; clustering; site-
participant multiplexing; scalable groups.
In short, NAVTECH foresees network infrastructures as composed of local clusters, in-
terconnected by the long-haul links of a global counterpart. Furthermore, it assumes that
both the local and the global parts have different interesting properties which protocols can
take advantage from. As a matter of fact, this model can be applied to the majority of ex-
isting large-scale networks based on reliable high-speed local-area networks interconnected
by slower long-haul connections (e.g. Internet, telecommunications). In the host scope, it
assumes the separation between computing (the participant part), and communication (the
site part). Finally, it assumes that the above-mentioned entities may form groups in either
part (site or participant groups), and be managed as such (participant and/or site-group
membership).
These constructs allow a designer using such a framework to draw conclusions that may
be extremely relevant to the nature, performance and scalability of applications built on top
of NAVTECH : the infrastructure is aWAN-of-LANs; protocols may extract advantages from
being topology-aware; protocols for distributed computing support may be different from
protocols for inter-site communication, this separation of concerns being advantageous for the
simplicity of either one; scalable groupsmay provide the right construct to keep together sig-
nificant numbers of sites or participants spread over an even more significant geographical
area, on an infrastructure of uncertain connectivity.
Several models supporting different assumptions about the correctness of programs have
been developed in this area (e.g. asynchronous, synchronous, or partially synchronous with
failure detectors; view-synchronous; primary partition; partitionable, etc.). NAVTECH has
attempted at defining a common denominator framework so that the infrastructure can be
reused for the several possible models enumerated. In short, NAVTECH has a model of
partial synchrony, which can vary anywhere in the space between synchronous and asyn-
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chronous. Obviously, not all semantics are possible over the complete synchrony spectrum.
Skeleton protocols, the only fixed algorithmic component of this framework, glue the several
NAVTECH modules in a way that secures the desired semantics, by acting appropriately on
the data flow path at precise points, called taps. The skeleton protocols, which are essentially
related with failure detection and membership, are generic automata, with placeholders for
functions that execute at certain points of system evolution.
In the classical debate pro/con groups, two issues have always emerged as being con-
troversial: that groups are often tied to a given communication semantics (e.g. causal); that
groups are heavyweight constructs and thus do not scale (e.g. beyond a few dozens). These
criticisms are relevant, and we learned that from true experience in our experiments with
groups. NAVTECH contributed to solving these problems by introducing a group model
which stands on its own, independently from the communication semantics each instanti-
ation may have. The groups are simple and composable for scalability. Different modules
of a compound may have different semantics. The importance given to architecture and in
particular the skeleton protocol approach—which gives structure to semantic independence
and group composability— were but early symptoms of a syndrome of growing evidence in
current research on group-oriented systems: importance is shifting from communication to
membership and failure detection, and from sheer algorithmics to architectural composition
of protocol modules made of microprotocols.
In summary, the NAVTECH framework specifies architectural constructs and mecha-
nisms to assist in the design and execution of dependable distributed applications in large-
scale settings. NAVTECH is essentially a macroscopic framework made of entities sitting on
components such as the Internet, metropolitan area networks, private local networks, vanilla
operating systems, satellite constellations, kept together by the glue of a run-time environ-
ment and a few protocols. The principles of NAVTECH are applicable to known infrastruc-
tural networking and computing technologies, and in that sense it is an open architecture,
applicable to systems built from COTS components and sub-systems.
The next section, Section 2, reports related work. Then, the paper is organised as follows.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the system model and architecture. Sections 5 and 6 address the
fundamental building blocks of NAVTECH , those concerned with failure detection and with
membership. Section 7 presents the modules related with the data path, which host the
Communication and Activity Services. Finally, the paper reviews several protocols that we
developed on top of NAVTECH with the aim of validating our ideas, and concludes with a
few retrospective remarks.
2 Related Work
Group-oriented systems are generic enough to support a mix of programming paradigms in
the client-server and event-based, publish-subscribe areas. Over the years, they have proved
to be an environment where it is straightforward to program complex reliable distributed
applications. The latest generation systems have tried to solve issues such as large-scale,
configurability and openess.
The NAVTECH work was not the first one to exploit topology information to improve
3
the design of group communication protocols. Several other examples can be found in the
literature. However, with a few notable exceptions, most examples were focused on the
solution of a particular problem, and have put their emphasis on algorithmics[4, 7, 8, 16,
23, 32]. To our knowledge, NAVTECH was pioneer in the coherent and systematic use of
topology awareness, through the definition of a generic architectural construct, the WAN-
of-LANs model. This enabled the application of topology awareness in a vertical manner, to
practically all protocols developed for NAVTECH .
Totem [27] and Transis [3] are amongst the projects that have addressed the topology
issue in a more systematic way. The Totem system provides total order multicast over in-
terconnected local-area networks. The system is based on a composition of intra-LAN and
inter-LAN protocols. The Transis system follows a network model that has similarities with
the one followed in NAVTECH , and in essence their approach is complementary to ours: in
Transis emphasis was given to efficient local-area communication and hierarchical composi-
tion while in NAVTECH emphasis was given on dynamic configuration and filtering of local
control data.
Composition is an established principle of distributed protocol design. Typical examples
of protocol composition frameworks are the -kernel[29], Horus [40], Ensemble [22], Coy-
ote [6]. The NAVTECH architecture is not tied to a concrete protocol composition framework,
but it assumes that modules are implemented using such a construct. More recently, we are
developing on the Appia framework[25]. One of the early prototypes of NAVTECH used the
Horus run-time, combined with our own protocols[10]. A subset of NAVTECH protocols,
namely the Light-Weight Group Service[36], have been implemented on the Ensemble sys-
tem. Recent works address scalability through probabilistic algorithmic approaches, trading
off determinism for scalability[21, 15].
3 SystemModel
Like in any other architectural framework, we paid special attention to the system model,
and its main facets: network hierarchy; processes and processors; fault assumptions and
synchronism. The functional aspects of the NAVTECH model are based on a few architec-
tural paradigms, which address the scale issues just discussed and put in place a few hooks
for topology awareness: 2-tier networking; clustering; site-participant multiplexing; groups
as a scalable construct. The non-functional aspects of the model prefigure what we believe
to be a reasonable assumption for a generic framework. In short, NAVTECH has a model of
partial or uncertain synchrony, that can vary anywhere in the space between synchronous
and asynchronous. The specific models that best reflect NAVTECH ’s synchrony assump-
tions are the timed-asynchronous[12] and the quasi-synchronous[46] models, or the recent
timely computing base model[41].
3.1 Topological Model
NAVTECH was designed for large-scale applications. Topology issues and communication
system characteristics have a fundamental impact on the achievable scale of computations,
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as systems grow in span, complexity and number of hosts. A large-scale network such as
the Internet forms what we might call the global network, with a number of structural charac-
teristics: sparse connectivity; limited diffusion capabilities; weak reliability and timeliness;
globe-wide distances; public-domain or standard protocols. On the other hand, local net-
work infrastructures take significantly different characteristics: availability of LAN or MAN
technology; dense connectivity (normally broadcast-level); good reliability and timeliness;
private operation, enterprise-oriented. This analysis identifies a fundamental topological
paradigm retained by NAVTECH : its organization as a 2-tier WAN-of-LANs.
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Figure 1: NAVTECH Topological Constructs: (a) Site-participant duality; (b) WAN-of-LANs
2-tier WAN-of-LANs
As we said before, large-scale computing infrastructures will retain a clear duality, which
is materialized by several aspects, from administration to technology, in what appears to
be a 2-tier infrastructure. Our model of WAN-of-LANs networks, consists of pools of sites
with high connectivity links, such as LANS or MANs, or ATM fabrics, interconnected in the
upper tier by a point-to-point global network. More concretely, we mean that: the global
network is public and runs standard, de jure or de facto, protocols; each local network is
run by a single, private, entity 1, and can thus run specific protocols alongside with or in
complement to standard ones.
Site and Facility Clustering
A fundamental feature of the NAVTECH platform is to take into account the clustering natu-
rally provided by the underlying network. In fact, clustering seems one of the most promis-
ing techniques to cope with large-scale, providing the means to implement effective divide-
and-conquer strategies. In todays’ networks, we identify at least two clustering entities: the
Site as a cluster of participants; the Facility as a cluster of sites.
What we might see as a first level of clustering consists in the separation between
communication and processing, by recognizing that the (sometimes large) number of
1E.g.: set of LANs of a university campus, MAN of a large industrial complex, LAN of a regional company
department.
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processes— the participants— that are engaged in distributed applications in a host, should
explicitly share the communication resources used for networking— the site part.
The second clustering level is obviously compatible with the 2-tier architecture iden-
tified in the previous section: separation of communication amongst local aggregates of
hosts, which we call facilities, from long-haul communication amongst facilities. Clustering
of sites that coexist locally can simplify internetwork addressing, communication and ad-
ministration. These sites are hidden behind a single entry-point, a facility gateway, a logical
gateway that represents the local network members, for the global network. Organization-
dependent clustering allows to run specific protocols behind the facility gateways, without
that colliding with the need to use standard protocols in wide-area networking. Global net-
work communication is thus performed essentially among facility gateways.
Sites and Participants
In NAVTECH , protocols implementing the interactions among entities in different hosts rec-
ognize the site-participant separation of concerns in the internal structure of system hosts,
as represented in Figure 1a: the Participant, one from a collection of end entities perform-
ing distributed activities in different hosts (e.g. processes, tasks, etc.); the Site, the under-
lying entity clustering all participants residing in a same host, and performing communi-
cation on behalf of them (e.g. the host’s communications server). The big picture of the
NAVTECH architecture, showing the 2-tier WAN-of-LANs and clustering, is illustrated in
Figure 1b.
Besides its practical relevance, the distinction between sites and participants in our
model is also of major theoretical relevance. In fact, there are well-known results about the
impossibility or difficulty of reliably detecting failures in distributed systems, depending
on their asynchrony[18, 8]. A system recognizing the site-participant duality may perform
failure detection more effectively: while site failure detection may be unreliable, participant
failures can be reliably detected. This has the virtue of reducing the range of events that
cause unreliable failure detection.
3.2 Group Model
The concept of group appears intuitively when describing many distributed actions[47]. In
fact, grouping participants spread over a large-scale network seems to help solving a num-
ber of the problems underlying the correct execution of an application: connectivity, efficient
addressing, reliable communication, consistency, and so forth. On the other hand, a current
criticism of group paradigms says that group services do not scale well. This remark is
particularly true when applied to systems not designed for large-scale, for example, offer-
ing just one model of group membership and communication protocols. It is impossible
to provide the same type of performance and correctness guarantees, both to a group with
thousands of members and to a group of a dozen members.
In NAVTECH , we address this contradiction through a composable group model. The
basic group is simple, but complex and very large scale applications can be formed by com-
posing several groups having different communication semantics. These groups can also be
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mapped both onto the interaction style and onto the topological structure. For example: a
group of a thousand members for dissemination with lightweight communication, versus a
group with a dozen members for managing a server replica set with heavyweight commu-
nication; or a hierarchy of groups whose top level exists at the Global Network level, with
its members representing lower-level groups inside Local Network clusters.
The 2-tier Unidirectional Group Model
One important characteristic of our architecture is the 2-tier separation between:
 groups of participants as users of the platform, in the sense normally used in other
works, i.e. sets of application processes;
 site-groups, as the set of sites where the entities relatedwith a participant group reside.
Groups are concerned with the consistency of distributed activities, whereas site-groups
are concerned with the correctness of communication. For example, in Figure 1a, the site-
group corresponding to group 

 

 is  . In consequence of this separation of con-
cerns, the membership and failure detection of participants and sites are decoupled. Par-
ticipant membership and site membership are concerned with groups and site-groups, re-
spectively. The corresponding guarantees about failure detection, are reliable in the former,
unreliable in the latter. This model is at the heart of the two-tier membership structure of
NAVTECH , detailed in Section 6.
The next important characteristic of the NAVTECH group model is the drastic difference
in the role of senders and recipients of messages. The model distinguishes between:
 members of the group, who are only recipients of messages;
 senders, who only send into the group.
It is thus a unidirectional group model, depicted on the left of Figure 2, which presents
the “open-loop” view of the information path from senders to members (recipients). How-
ever, the classical bidirectional access to a group is also easily achieved, as depicted on the
right of Figure 2. Sender and member endpoints are denoted S and M, respectively, in Fig-
ure 2 and the ones that follow. Participants, depending on whether they are going to send,
or receive, or both, acquire a sender or a member interface to the group, or both. Besides, a
participant can be sender to, or member of, several groups. At this point, we can also be pre-
cise about the meaning of group and site-group. The members of a group are exclusively the
participants who receive messages sent to the group. In the example on the left of Figure 2,
the group

has twomembers that reside in sites A and B. On the other hand, a site-group is
in charge of performing inter-site communication correctly and efficiently. In consequence,
there will be a site-group member in every site where there is activity related with the corre-
sponding group. In the example, there are senders to the group in sites B and C. This means
that considering both the members and the senders involved, the corresponding site-group


includes sites A, B and C. In conclusion, a site-group has the following characteristics:
 it is formed by the sites (one element per site) that hold at least one sender or member
of a group;
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 it implements group addressing by mapping group names on site addresses (network
hosts);
 its membership includes the delivery set of reliable protocols (i.e. determines the ac-
knowledgments to be expected);
 it implements the protocols that perform communication from within that group;
 it is a contact point for protocols that perform communication from outside that group.
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Figure 2: NAVTECH 2-tier unidirectional group model
Thinking of the system as having two levels of abstraction, site- and participant-level,
may significantly improve its performance and scalability[47]. A sitemultiplexes all the local
participants related with a given group, through a single communication endpoint (the local
site-group member) that represents the group for the network. Site-group members multi-
plex local senders-to and members-of, a given group. The practical implications are that if
there are more than onemember of a group in a site, only one message is sent there, and then
copied to all recipients. Likewise, when a site fails, a single run of a site failure detection al-
gorithm needs to be executed, instead of having many runs executing in parallel as in some
other earlier generation groups systems[33, 26, 7]. On the other hand, site-group members
process the send requests from their local senders, and run the protocols that ensure deliv-
ery to the members, with the requested guarantees. Senders are not full-right members of
a group. They get from the system just the necessary information and support to send to
the group with the required quality of service, but without further overhead. The first par-
ticipant joining a group creates the corresponding local site-group member. Only members
partake whatever functions concern the management of the group, and in consequence pay
the associated cost. This separation of roles is paramount to our claim of obtaining a simple
but scalable group model, by composition. Consider a traditional heavyweight and bidi-
rectional group model, that is, one where the separation site-participant does not exist, and
where each endpoint has to cope with both transmission and reception: it is quite awkward
to build more complex applications by using that kind of groups. As we show in the next
section, building applications by composition with our group model is conceptually very
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simple.
Composing Groups
A 2-tier unidirectional group model is a very simple building block for more complex appli-
cations. Real program entities (processes, tasks, threads, etc.) will incarnate senders and/or
members on a need basis, and thus will only be as complex as required.
For example, a producers-consumers application will fit directly onto unidirectional
communication, by providing the producers with simple send access to the group of con-
sumers, and giving each consumer a member status. Likewise, a multipeer conversation
is configured by having each entity become both a sender and member participant for that
group.
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Figure 3: “Publishers/subscribers” application
The right of Figure 3 shows how to implement the well-known publishers/subscribers
paradigm, depicted on the left. 

is the publishing server implementing the message bus,
which is made reliable by replication. Publishers simply acquire sender interfaces to the
group of replicas 

. This is combined with dissemination to the subscribers groups, which
may be more than one (

,

), according to the subscription semantics and interests. This
task can either be centralized in a main replica, or divided by the replicas, as shown in
the figure: the server replica 

, while receiving from its member interface 	
	
to group


, disseminates chosen information to the group of subscribers 

, through its send-only
interface 
	
to the group.
An interesting feature of our model is revealed in this case: the independence of com-
munication and activity semantics from the group model, and its effect on scale. We know
from experience that some algorithms do not scale. The question is whether all algorithms
have to scale. By analyzing the semantic needs of the main interaction styles (client-server,
multipeer, dissemination) we arrived at the interesting conclusion that scale is bound to se-
mantics of communication. In short, the greater the scale of computations, the lesser the
semantic guarantees required of communication, and protocols may take advantage of that.
One approach pursued in NAVTECH is, for example, preventing semantically “heavy-
weight” communication from occurring outside the local network scope. In the example
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above, the client-server publishing databasemay be accessed through atomic multicast com-
munication and primary-partition replication management. However, dissemination to sub-
scribers can be implemented through a weaker QoS, for example best-effort multicast, to
comply with the different scale needs of this part of the interaction. Scale requirements are
fulfilled because of the freedom of the designer to select the adequate semantics for each
group. These conjectures were validated by several of the algorithms and protocols devel-
oped (
 [39]). Recent protocols exploit semantics in an even more sophisticated way[28].
3.3 Fault and Synchrony Model
Formalizing, we assume a system model where a set  of participants noted 

 


  ex-
change messages relying on the respective sites 

 

 . Sites are interconnected by a com-
munication network and execute communication protocols on behalf of the participants.
Communication and activity are group based, where if a set of participants forms a group


, then the set of sites involved in communication to and within that group forms a site-
group 

.
We assume the system to follow an omissive failure model, that is, components only do
timing, omission and crash failures, and no value failures occur. More precisely, they only do
late timing failures. In what concerns processing or communication delays, the system can
have any degree of synchronism, that is, if bounds exist, their magnitude may be uncertain
or not known. The only strong assumption about time is that local clocks exist and have a
bounded rate of drift towards real time.
What can or not be done in a distributed system depends on how faithfully a crash fail-
ure can be detected[8]. Normally, this amounts to being able to specify what is a detectable
omissive failure[44]. Crash failures are particular cases of timing failures, where a process
produces infinitely many timing failures with infinite lateness degree. In consequence, an
omission degree[42, 44] specification is the most usual way of specifying a detectable crash:
timing failures beyond a certain lateness degree (amount of delay) are transformed into
omissions through a timeout based detector. Then, going beyond an omission degree thresh-
old (number of successive failures) is finally considered a crash.
Different instances of the NAVTECH framework, and/or specific protocol combinations,
may depend on additional synchrony and fault assumptions. For example, if the system syn-
chrony is such that a perfect failure detector cannot be built, then many practical problems
have no deterministic solution. However, if an eventual strong failure detector can be built,
then problems such as atomic multicast delivery are possible under certain conditions[8].
Recall that NAVTECH is a framework. In consequence, the contribution of this work is
to provide the best possible architectural constructs to improve the implementation of large-
scale distributed systems, in complement to and in assistance of algorithmic approaches
enhancing scalability. The latter have been exploited in the several algorithms and protocols
we published over the past few years[39], whereas the main focus of the rest of the paper
lies with the former.
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4 The Architecture of NAVTECH
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Figure 4: NAVTECH Architecture: ‘depends-on’ relation
The overall architecture of NAVTECH is represented in Figure 4, illustrating the
‘depends-on’ relation between modules. The NAVTECH platform lies on an abstraction of a
multipoint network, theMultipoint Network, MN, created over the physical infrastructure. Its
main properties are the provision of multipoint addressing and a moderate partition heal-
ing ability, both depending on topology information. The Site Failure Detector (SF) module
is in charge of assessing the connectivity to and liveness of remote sites, and depends on the
Multipoint Network, by listening to traffic going into each site, and by exchanging infor-
mation with other  modules. The Site Membership (SM) module depends on information
given by the  module. Based on the latter, and on interface calls, it creates and modifies
the membership and view of site-groups. The Communication Support Services module, CS,
implements reliable communication and clock synchronization. It depends on information
given by the 	 module, about the composition of recipient groups, for example to de-
termine where acknowledgments are expected from, to inform users about changes, or to
ensure that a message is delivered to a given group composition. It implements protocols
and algorithms that allow participants to communicate between sites, from best-effort to
reliable or atomic multicast.
Together, these modules form the ’site’ part of a host. All the four modules described
are topology sensitive, that is, protocols may run differently depending on the following
conditions: ’this host’ is in a local network; ’this host’ is in the global network; ’this host’ is
a Facility Gateway.
The Participant Failure Detector module, PF, is a module with strictly local operation:
based on probes implemented with O.S. support, it assesses liveness of participants, accord-
ingly to pre-established failure criteria. Note the decoupling between site and participant
failure detection whose virtues have been discussed earlier in this paper. The Participant
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Membershipmodule, PM, depends on information propagated by the 	 and the  mod-
ules. Based on the latter, and on interface calls, it creates and modifies the membership of
participant groups, and validates activity conditions, such as, for example, majority in a pri-
mary partition. The Activity Support Services module, AS, depends on the group communi-
cation and clock services provided by the  module, and on the membership information
provided by the 	 module. It implements protocols and algorithms that assist partici-
pant activity, such as replication management, mutual exclusion and concurrency control,
cooperation awareness, etc. These three modules form the ’participant’ part of the host.
Although not shown for simplicity, there can be several of these participant-level mod-
ules mapped onto the site part, for example representing different unrelated application
support environments which make use of the common communication services. Likewise,
in the same  module there can be several groups of participants mapped onto one site
group, in what is called a lightweight group structure. NAVTECH uses groups as its central
paradigm, but has a separation of concerns that is beneficial to system composability and
scalability: (a) a participant group 

is concerned with the correctness and consistency of
the execution of distributed applications, and relies on the assistance of the algorithms in
the  module for that purpose; (b) 

members delegate communication on the site group


, which runs communication protocols served by .
The membership service is the spinal cord of NAVTECH . As depicted on the left of Fig-
ure 6, there is a chain of information between membership related modules, down from the
site Failure Detector module up to the participant Failure Detector. This information is used
to act on the group communication and activity data flows, ensuring that the correctness
conditions of the chosen semantics are met. The membership structure intersects the data
flow through constructs called taps, shown in the figure, at the bottom of the Communication
Support () and Activity Support () modules. The taps perform filtering, multiplexing
and demultiplexing functions, which will be detailed later in the text.
By acting on the data flow through the several taps, the membership/failure detection
protocols enforce typical baseline semantics, defined in terms of profiles, which we detail
below and depict in Figure 5.
The Multicasting tap enforces a weak-partial membership, depending on the failure in-
formation supplied by the SF module, which keeps track of the hosts that are mutually
connected. This way, it secures the best-effort profile, where views are mainly supposed to
assist multicast addressing. Several views may thus be formed in a system, namely in the
presence of partitions. Those views reflect in the best manner possible the set of sites that
are mutually reachable, but no further guarantees are given. The best-effort profile can use
protocols further up, but it bypasses all filters up to the participant, as sketched in Figure 5,
that is, the other taps are so to speak forced open at all times.
The Comunication tap establishes a hook between site membership and reliable multi-
cast protocols, to ensure they have the property characterizing the view-synchronous profile,
namely, a strong-partial membership, meaning that several views may exist, but their in-
tersection is empty. Informally speaking, this means that the tap opens and closes under
command of the site membership protocol, and may even divert the data flow through
the Site Membership module, in order to enforce the desired semantics. This profile al-
lows a framework for building applications of the kind explored for example in [4]. The
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Figure 5: Data flow through the NAVTECH profiles
view-synchronous profile can use protocols further up, but it bypasses all filters up to the
participant.
The Activity tap establishes a hook between participant membership and activity man-
agement protocols (e.g. replication management), to ensure they have the property char-
acterizing the primary-partition profile, namely a linear membership, based on the majority
criterion. This means that a single view is allowed to be in activity, at all times. This tap
operates in a way similar to the Communication tap.
Note that NAVTECH allows the definition of other semantics besides the typical ones, im-
plemented by disabling (opening) any of the taps and constructing ad-hoc protocols in the
corresponding module. For example, optimistic consistency approaches might be achieved
by: using  protocols on top of the view-synchronous profile; bypassing the (primary-
partition) Activity tap; and implementing  protocols to achieve the desired semantics.
The well-known works based on failure detectors to implement consensus and atomic mul-
ticast to fixed destination sets (static membership) can be implemented bypassing the Com-
munication tap and building the relevant protocols in the  module.
5 Failure Detection
A NAVTECH Domain is the collection of machines where a collection of related
NAVTECH software is supposed to run. Given that a NAVTECH Domain is foreseen to run
on global, world-wide network infrastructures (e.g. Internet), there is a registration proce-
dure, not detailed here, whereby new sites (machines) get to be known to the other ma-
chines in the Domain. From now on, when we say ’all sites’ we mean all sites registered in a
NAVTECH Domain.
Given the uncertain degree of synchrony assumed for NAVTECH , site failure detection
may be unreliable. However, our concern in this paper is to define a failure detection struc-
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ture and explain the correctness of the relevant mechanisms, independently from the fault
and synchrony assumptions of the system. The structure is modular, and the only thing
that changes with changing assumptions is the particular implementation of some of the
modules.
5.1 Site Failure Detection
The Site Failure Detection Service is performed by the module with the same name,  .
The objective of the service is to assess the state of the sites running distributed applications
under NAVTECH .
The majority of detectors known are crash failure detectors. Its utility has been discussed
in several works both in the asynchronous and synchronous worlds. A known paper by
Chandra & Toueg has established a hierarchy of crash failure detectors, and the problems
they can solve[8]. The most powerful is a perfect crash failure detector. Then, accordingly to
decreasing faithfulness of the detector, in the measure that synchronism decreases, we have
less and less accurate detectors, with weaker properties.
It has been shown by Chandra & Toueg[8] that detectors need accuracy and completeness
to be effective. More recently, it has been shown[17, 2] that if they could further detect timing
failures in a timely manner, the system would be able to address timeliness problems, even
if being almost asynchronous or imperfectly synchronous. Timed accuracy and completeness
were defined in [41], allowing to characterize timing failure detectors.
Usually, the output of failure detectors serves the purpose of system reconfiguration,
for example, a progress condition of a protocol, a new view in the membership of a group.
However, when: (a) the criterion for a detector to declare crash of a process or site is static;
(b) the semantics of such detection is poor, then chances are that the system: (a’) will not be
able to adapt to the changing environment; (b’) will suffer from the many mistakes of the
detector.
Triggering reconfiguration using fixed and/or aggressive timeouts may cause instability
problems in settings of uncertain timeliness, such as large-scale networks. The effect on
replicated, collaborative, or QoS-sensitive applications would be disastrous, with the system
configuration bouncing back and forth at an unbearable rate. We can imagine participants
doing nothing but coming in and out of collaboration groups, servers disapearing from a
replica group or joining and leaving without rest, multimedia streams going back and forth
from colour to B&W, or high to low compression.
The detectors proposed by Chandra try to overcome the uncertainty of the environ-
ment’s synchrony (is a site slow or crashed?) by successively increasing the timeout period.
But the detector is still looking for a crash. We have introduced QoS failure detectors, which
finesse the semantics of failure. Observe that omissive failures are a spectrum that goes
from timing, through omission, to crash. Omission failures are timing failures with infinite
lateness degree. Crash failures are infinitely many omission failures.
We define the symptom of QoS failure using the multidimensional quantitative mea-
sures one normally includes in the notion of quality of service (QoS) or level of service
(LoS)[11], such as bandwidth, latency, omission degree or rate. The semantics of our de-
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Figure 6: Detailed View of the NAVTECH Modules: 2-tier membership and failure detection
structure (SF, SM, PM, PF); data flow modules (MN, CS, AS)
tectors becomes richer, and hence they do less mistakes.
5.2 Failure, Suspicion and Detection
Each site has a local site failure detection module  . Themain data structures of a local  ,
as shown in Figure 6, are the Connectivity Scratchpad, 

, and theDomain View,  . Given
a Domain   

 

  

, the 

holds several kinds of information: the local  ’s
opinion on each site; the other  s’ opinions on each site; the result of failure detection
tests.   contains the current global opinion about the hosts that are alive. A failure
detector protocol running among all  s maintains   up to date, by processing the
information contained in the scratchpads and getting to a consensual decision on it. For the
sake of scalability, each site only needs to keep track of sites registered in the Domain that
are currently members of a site-group which the local site belongs to.
For the purpose of detection, a site has a failure if it does not comply with a specifica-
tion , which is a proposition of behavior in the omissive domain. For example, a site
would be crash-failed if it did more than  successive omissions (e.g., failing more than 
’I’m-alives’ or ’heartbeats’ in a period of reference); or, it would be QoS-failed if it exhib-
ited an error rate higher than , or a roundtrip time higher than . Besides distinguishing
between crash and QoS failure, we also distinguish between local suspicion, under the re-
sponsibility of a single module, and global detection, based on the opinion of all detector
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modules. Finally, unlike all failure detector works we are aware of, we allow different sets
of sites to behave differently (i.e., follow different s) according to the application needs
they serve. Consider  containing the definitions of correct site behavior for some set of
sites  (  ). Then:
Local Suspicion Vector (

) - a vector of Booleans with  positions, for each local
site 

	 , such that 

 contains the opinion of 

about every other 
 
;
additionally, position 

   iff the behavior of 

as seen from 

exceeded (was
worse than) the thresholds imposed by ; it contains  otherwise.
Crash Failure Suspicion
Consider  to be a specification of the crash failure class, such as used by canonical failure
detectors (e.g. ’heartbeats’). In consequence, we define crash failure suspicion:
A site 

suspects site 

is crash-failed iff: 

   , for 
 crash failure
At this point, the reader will note that each local  instance has a Local Suspicion
Vector,  . Now, we discuss how to transform our crash detector onto a semantically
richer quality-of-service failure detector.
QoS Failure Suspicion
Instead of the relatively poor crash semantics, the failure detector can be configured to de-
tect Quality-of-Service (QoS) failures, if we redefine  to be in fact aQoS specification. This
does not reduce the generality of our work, since a crash failure is a subset of a QoS failure,
where the expected QoS is for the site to be up. The main difference is that so to speak we
have introduced analog (versus binary) failure detection. We summarize the QoS failure detec-
tion mechanism below, the complete treatment can be found in [11, 43]. On the other hand,
the QoS failure detection concept is a very broad one, and can reach parameters such as
disk and network bandwidth, processor usage, video quality, etc., for processor resources as
well as communication. A good example is QoS measurement among multiple multimedia
rendering processes in a site. The following definitions are extensive to that realm.
A QoS  is based on a set of parameters, referring to time-domain parameters, such
as roundtrip delay, throughput and omission error rate. For each parameter  , we define:
the sampling period, or interval of reference; the threshold () not to be exceeded (posi-
tively or negatively) by the value of the parameter during that period; and the weight ( )
or relative importance of the parameter in the final result. Each parameter of the QoS spec-
ification is evaluated by the QoS-FD at each site 

, for every other site 
 
of the set. We
note the value  associated with parameter  kept at local site  about some remote site 
as  

 . For instance,  

  denotes the roundtrip delay between sites 

and 

as measured at 

.
Once a threshold set, what is recorded over time by 

is the percentage of sampling
periods where it it was exceeded, for each 

as seen from 

. We call this variable Threshold
Exceeded (TE). For example, !  	 for round-trip time means that in 	
 of the times the
round-trip time threshold was exceeded. In other words, over time, ! gives a measure of
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the current coverage of the threshold assumption for a given  . In this last example, the
round-trip time assumption is holding with a probability of 
. The weighted average of
the ! of all parameters  , for each 

as seen from 

, gives the Disturbance Index:
DI




WT   TE

 "


WT 
A value of #

exceeding a # thresholdmeans a QoS failure of 

, in the opinion of 

.
This is reflected in the  evaluation, by setting 

  . # is computed periodically
for each 

in , as specified by the QoS sampling period. After the computation of the # ,
! variables are reset, and incremented from zero until the next computation of# . A very
low # value means that the QoS in the current set is within satisfactory thresholds.
Consider  to be a QoS failure class specification. In consequence, we define QoS
failure suspicion:
A site 

suspects site 

is Qos-failed iff: 

   , for  
 QoS failure
This means that we perform essentially analog failure detection, and only at this point
we do the analog-to-digital conversion of the local failure symptom. The reader will note
that the QoS failure detector is the most general kind of FD, crash failure detection being a
special case of the former.
General Failure Detection
Wenow discuss the issue of general failure detection in our system (be it resulting from crash
or QoS suspicions). Recall that each local  instance has a Local Suspicion Vector,  .
Now it is necessary to test each other’s opinions, to assess the symmetry and transitivity of
the site’s connections. Failure detector modules should actively cooperate to reach a decision
as closer as possible to the true state of sites, and as unanimous as possible, in fact, to reach
a decision about failure detection, from these suspicions.
It is known that these attributes, named accuracy and completeness[8], assume a range
that depends on the system fault and synchrony model. In NAVTECH we put the adequate
hooks in place for any kind of detector to be built (without loss of generality, recall that
  ):
Global Suspicion Matrix (	

) - a matrix of Booleans with  positions, formed by
the  of all sites in  as received by each local site 

, such that each row	 
is 

. If site 

suspects 

then 	   is true, and false otherwise. If all sites
suspect 

, then column 	   is true. We consider the diagonal 	  , ,
as don’t cares
Decision Function- the specification of a convergence function over 	 , whose result,
each time it converges, yields the new state of , possibly implying the failure detec-
tion of one or more sites
Global State Vector (

) - a vector of Booleans with  positions, as output from the
convergence function for each local site 

that has reached a decision, such that
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

   only if 

was detected failed (rather than just suspected); it contains 
otherwise
Local  ’s exchange suspicions ( ) each time they occur, and accumulate these suspi-
cions in a Scratchpad, 

. At relevant points of the FD execution, the convergence function
is run on the 	 , to produce a failure detection decision. The decision may concern more
than one site simultaneously.
Consider a “Chandra/Toueg” strong failure detector. For such a detector to be built, the
collection of decisions at all sites would have to be such that the resulting matrix of  ’s
should yield: for every failed 

,      for all 

; and there exists at least one 

such that   $   for all 

. A convergence function detecting that property over all
 modules would converge upon any failure. On the other hand, a convergence function
for an eventual strong failure detector, would converge upon a finite but unknown time.
There are other possibilities though. A refinement we introduced in failure detection in
NAVTECH is the possibility of placing more trustworthiness on the decision of some local
FDs than on others’. This is used to tune algorithms based on topology awareness or partic-
ipant role. Consider the distinguished role of the facility agent, for example, as the mediator
between the local and the global network. Likewise, in cooperative applications, the ’social
role’ is paramount: for example, in a tutorial over the network, the opinion of the lecturer’s
connectivity to the participants is more important than each others’ connectivity[10]. This
enhancement is detailed in [11, 43].
In conclusion, consider 
  to be an adequate function to detect the failure of a site,
such as would be used by canonical crash-only detectors (e.g. ’strong failure detection’). In
consequence, we define (general) site failure detection:
A site 

detects site 

as failed iff: 

    after a decision function
converged
No matter what kind of decision about failure detection, the  protocol should notify
the relevant modules, namely the Site Membership module. Nevertheless, it would be good
if this information were postponed, in situations of high but short-lived network instability,
in order to avoid undesirable bouncing between costly system reconfigurations. We describe
mechanisms for improving failure suspicions next.
Recovery
So far, we have left recovery out of this discussion, not to distract the reader. We introduce
it now: our detectors are symmetric, and might be called failure/recovery detectors. In a
generic framework, detectors must encompass the fact that in some models, processes do
recover[31, 14, 1]. In the definitions we have made, recovery may be substituted for failure.
For example, given a previously failed site 

, a site 

suspects site 

is alive iff 

   .
Likewise, a site 

detects site 

as alive iff 

    after a decision function converged.
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5.3 Improving Failure Detection Accuracy
In this section we discuss mechanisms which, albeit improvements to our generic failure
detection framework, go beyond mere engineering optimizations. We propose a low-pass
filter or debouncer, to integrate suspicions, and a partition healing facility. The purpose of both
is to delay failure detection notification and allow for the system to stabilize. In both cases,
this is done when there is sufficient evidence that we are in face on a short-lived instability
period. Notice that none of these overrides known theoretical impossibility results. Our
experiments have however shown that these measures drastically improve the behavior of
FDs in systems of uncertain timeliness.
Suspicion Debouncing
Let us consider the failure detector performs series of ’test epochs’, and the LSV is evaluated
after each test epoch. We redefine suspicion, by introducing two states of suspicion: a site
is suspected faulty if it fails a test, and is suspected failed if it fails 

successive tests. In
consequence, we define fault and failure suspicion:
A site 

suspects site 

is faulty iff: 

    after a test epoch
A site 

suspects site 

is failed iff: 

    for 

successive test epochs
Conversely, a site is suspected to be recovering after the first epoch where 

   ,
but is not considered alive until being recovering for 

successive test epochs. We allow the
system to give different values to 

and 

just for versatility reasons. The decision function
is not activated until a site is suspected ’failed’ or ’alive’, but the ’faulty’ and ’recovering’
suspicions are disseminated as gossips, namely to improve accuracy of the partition healing
mechanism that we discuss next.
The effect of this mechanism is akin to combining two hardware mechanisms: the me-
chanical or electronic debouncers of digital switches, and the noise supressors of transmis-
sion lines. When a switch is closed, contacts physically bounce, such that the logical value
switches several times between  to , before assuming the final value. A system inad-
vertently designed will register an enormous number of transitions, instead of only one,
as would do a debounced switch. On the other hand, noise in a digital line whose steady
state is ’1’ may sometimes cause it to bounce to ’0’ for short times. A noise supressor will
filter out any such bounce whose duration is less than a specified ’low’ pulse. Achieving the
equivalent of these two mechanisms is our objective.
Partition Healing
Partitioning occurs when a network is split such that sites cannot continue to enjoy the
symmetry, transitivity and connectivity properties. Telling network partitioning from site
failure is useful, because the system support can do things in order to repair the problem, or
avoid a premature declaration of failure of the out-partition sites:
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 the simplest is for the  to wait, during a given timeout, for a possible merge, instead
of immediately declaring failure of the affected sites. This has the virtue of preventing
the application from reconfiguring twice (back and forth) when the partition occurs
for a short period of time.
 more sophisticated, but quite effective, is partition healing. Besides preventing prema-
ture failure declaration as well, it also attempts at removing the physical symptoms of
partition.
For a site 

, a site 

is partitioned if at least one of the following predicates
hold:
Non-transitive Partition - there is a site 

, such that: 

is alive for 

, and 

is alive for


, and 

is failed for 

Non-symmetrical Partition - 

is failed for 

, and 

is alive for 

Total partition - there is a partition 

, to which 

belongs, and there is a partition 

, to
which 

belongs, such that: all sites in 

are failed for all sites in 

, and all sites in


are alive for all sites in 

In the non-transitive partition example it is easy to imagine the decisions produced by
successive test epochs, if influenced in turn by 

, 

, and 

: % &, % & , & . If
propagated up, this will causemembership instability, obviously undesirable. Addressing this
problem on a best-effort basis inside NAVTECH is not only possible but straightforward to
implement. Whilst IPv6 is bound to improve routing responsiveness, connectivity glitches
still last longer than desirable, for example due to the load queues that build up[24]. The
above notion of partition can be extended to several sets of partitions. When the  has
additional information on the state of the network, provided by the	' for example, it may
be possible to correlate failure of GlobalNet links to the defaulting route, in case of partial
partition, or to the composition of 

, in the case of total partition.
5.4 Failure Detector Skeleton Protocol
In this section, we present the skeleton protocol for the failure detector. Recall that the
NAVTECH framework leaves room for several failure detection semantics. This is achieved
by defining the skeleton in terms of macro functions that can be implemented in different
ways. Several known failure detector algorithms can be embedded into the skeleton protocol
and take advantage of the added functionality provided by NAVTECH , such as QoS failure
detection, suspicion debouncing and partition healing.
Basic Failure Detector
The basic failure detector is based on having a test function run forever, 
!( in line 11,
with a specification , a target set of sites ), which may be the domain or one of the
site-groups, and a period &% ) .
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// LSV: (1)-faulty; 1- failed; (0)- recovering; 0- alive
10 do forever
11 

= testEpoch(Spec,Target,SamplingPeriod)
12 od
15 when changed(

) do
16 broadcast(

)
17 decide(

)
18 od
20 when received(

) do
21 update(

)
22 od
25 when 

=decided(

) do
26 notify(

)
27 od
30 when 

  	
 during 

consecutive epochs do
31 

  

32 broadcast(

)
33 decide(

)
34 od
40 when 

   during 

consecutive epochs do
41 

  

42 broadcast(

)
43 od
45 when partitioned(

) do
46 reRoute(

) during 

epochs
47 od
50 when healed(

) do
51 restoreRoute(

)
52 od
Figure 7: Failure Detector Skeleton Protocol (For each 

)
Whenever, in result of the tests, the state variable changed(

) is true, meaning
that the Local Suspicion Vector has changed, that information is broadcast to the domain
(lines 15-16), and the sites immediately update their Global Suspicion Matrices (line 21). Im-
mediately after, a decision process is invoked among the sites taking part in the detection
process (line 17).
Recall that the decision function may assume different forms, that will dictate the fail-
ure detector semantics, and also the probability of convergence, but the skeleton protocol
does not change. In Section 5.2 we have exemplified this point inspired by some of the
asynchronous failure detector semantics presented in [8].
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QoS Failure Detection
Let us go back to the test epoch. Introducing QoS failure detection does not modify the
generic protocol, just the implementation of the 
!( function. The QoS test semantics
is defined by external requests, through variable types exported by the  service, their
values being set in a user-dependent fashion. The test is mainly implemented by: (a) eaves-
dropping on source addresses of incoming messages; (b) sending explicit probe messages
to complement the former (sites from where nothing arrives for too long); (c) periodic mes-
sages exchanged by  modules.
The detector we designed for NAVTECH is oriented to assess connectivity, and thus mea-
sures: roundtrip delay, throughput and omission error rate. A QoS specification oriented to
connectivity and an example test epoch are illustrated in Table 1.
QoS Specification Test Results
host

host

... host

... host

Parameter TS TH WT TE  

TE  

... TE  

... TE  

roundtrip (ms) 0  2 5 120 30 250 ... - - ... 0 30
throughput (Kb/s) 100m  1 0 90 20 5 ... - - ... 0 70
omission rate (/s) 10m  1 0 0 0 0 ... - - ... 0 0
... . . . . . . . ... - - ... . .
Disturbance Index (DI) 10s  - 2.5 20 ... - ... 0
   
Local Suspicion Vector LCV

 0 1 ... - ... 0
Table 1: QoS Specification for a Test Epoch and Example Results at Site 

Instability Dampening
Failure detection can be dampened in the interest of system stability, by introducing suspi-
cion debouncing. Recall that this is done by introducing two states of suspicion. The test
epoch is modified to change  positions to faulty after a single run. Furthermore, the
state variable changed(

) only admits failed and alive values, not faulty. As shown
in lines 30-31, with debouncing it takes 

test epochs for a site to be suspected failed. Since
the action in lines 15-18 is only performed when and  position is changed to failed,
the suspicion is only “made official” when it is persistent enough, i.e. after 

test epochs.
Likewise, when the site is recovering, it is “quarantined” for 

test epochs before the
suspicion of recovery to the alive state is disseminated (lines 40-42).
Partition Healing
Partition healing is attempted whenever the symptoms provided by diagnosis of the Global
Suspicion Matrix indicate partitioning, upon which the state variable partitioned(	

) is
set (line 45). Rerouting of traffic for the partitioned sites is attempted, by resorting to the
help of “friendly” sites in the domain. Function reRoute(	

), whose details we discuss
below, is invoked for that purpose (line 46).
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Partitions are sometimes due to temporary flickering of the network, and thus short-
lived, but nevertheless disturbing, given the inertia of current IP routing. However, most
of the times, they result from failure of a link, in a situation where there are alternate paths.
However, for several reasons, routing in most global network settings, such as the Inter-
net, is rather static, and not bound to change on account of these occurrences. However,
the situation tends to change, namely in the forthcoming new Internet protocols. The parti-
tion healing facility is modular and can be disabled if and when standard protocols handle
partitioning better.
The partition healing facility is performed on a best-effort basis by the Multipoint Net-
work (MN) protocols running over IP, through IP-tunneling, under the control of the  .
Let us define 

, the local site, 

, the out-partition (that is, the set of sites which 

cannot communicate directly with), and 

, the mediating sites, which can communicate
with both 

and sites in 

. For example, imagine that di.fc.ul.pt, in Portugal ( 

), is cut
off from cornell.edu, in the U.S.A. (belonging 

), but newcastle.uk, in the U.K., (belonging
to 

, the mediator set), communicates both with di.fc.ul.pt and cornell.edu. Obvious places
both for these syndroms to be detected and for the remedy to be applied are the facility
gateways.
The idea is very simple. The  , upon deciding ‘partial-partition’ failure, does not in-
form the 	 module, as would be normal. Instead, it makes a call (function reRoute(	

))
to the MN module, with the following semantics:
 Reroute(

	 

, 

	 

): Reroute all communication from 

addressed to site


in 

, through site 

in 

In the skeleton protocol, we chose to maintain this rerouting during 

epochs (line 46).
If the partition disappears in the meantime, state variable healed(	

) is set, which makes
the  instruct the	' to go back to the old route (function reRoute(	

) in line 51). How-
ever, the implementation of reRoute only allows the change back after 

epochs of rerouting
have elapsed. This is a very simple form of hysteresis, in order to avoid routing instability.
In our example, traffic from di.fc.ul.pt to cornell.edu would then be temporarily tunneled to
newcastle.uk, which would then forward it to cornell.edu. Details of the implementation of
rerouting are given in [19].
Decision Functions
When a suspicion is made public (line 17), a decision function on	

is invoked (line 18).
This function implements the semantics of failure/recovery detection, and triggers a nor-
mally distributed decision process amongst the relevant sites, which exchange their 	 ’s
and try to reach agreement on a common Global Suspicion Vector,  . If there is not suffi-
cient evidence for the decision function to converge, the decision fails. Typically, when there
is a failure, the 	 progressively stabilizes in the measure that all sites become aware of
it. The decision function itself may assume several forms, as we have already seen. It is not
always required that all  ’s decide, that depends on the semantics. When it converges,
into a Global Suspicion Vector, 

, a notification of failure or recovery is issued to other
modules, by sending them the new Global Suspicion Vector (line 26). An  can be re-
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quested explicitly, for example if a site is suspected. Whenever an 

is not trusted, for
example when it is not returned after requested, the corresponding row in the	 is filled
with ’don’t cares’, * .
5.5 Participant Failure Detection
The Participant Failure Detector ( ) works very simply by exporting a set of pre-defined
test types, to be used by applications and protocols for participant surveillance. The actual
mechanisms are not presented in this paper, but they act both at the level of the Activity
Support (
 Figure 6) on the flow to and from the participants, and by using operating sys-
tem probes. Examples of measurable symptoms are: no observable response, process crash
signals from O.S., excessive length of input message queue, etc. Participant failure detection
is performed in a way similar to site failure detection, though made exclusively locally. Like-
wise, the detector accepts requests to test specifications, from simple crash failure to more
complex QoS failure, based on the test types exported.
The main data structure of a  , as shown in Figure 6, is the Probe Scratchpad, 

. The


contains the participant tests criteria and the Local Detection Vector ( ), a vector of
Booleans, with positions, one for each local participant, such that  + contains the
state of 


, as seen by the local Participant Failure Detector,  . Whenever a participant 


fails a test,  +  , and the  reports the failure detection to the Participant Member-
ship module (	 ). Some of the detection improvement mechanisms discussed in Section 5
can be applied to participant failure detection as well, although we do not address it for
simplicity.
As said before, this local detection is a reliable one, in comparison to site failure detec-
tion, which may be unreliable due to the FLP impossibility result. On the other hand, the
failure of a site implies the failure of all participants residing there. We will take advantage
of this fact in our 2-tier membership structure in the next section. In consequence, we define
participant failure detection:
A participant  

residing in site 

is detected failed at site 

iff:
    and      by the local 
    and site 

detects site 

as failed
6 Membership
The membership structure in NAVTECH has a few attributes, devoted to handling the scale
and uncertainty problems of large systems:
modularity - separated from failure detection;
data independence - separated from data flow, hooked at specific points (taps);
two-tier - hierarchical membership structure, divided in site and participant levels;
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sticky membership - group elements do not lose membership when they fail
Modularity and data independence are key for handling autonomous operation of failure
detection, the membership structure itself, and the data flow modules. The taps are points
with awell identified interface to the communication and activity protocols, where themem-
bership structure can exert different kinds of synchronization and control.
The two-tier structure has several advantages. Firstly, when more than one participant
joins the same group at a site, the joins subsequent to the first are lightweight, since the
hard part of membership maintenance resides with the site membership part. Likewise, the
same happens when participants leave the group, until the last one. Mechanisms trying
to achieve a similar functionality were devised in DELTA4[31] and in ISIS[20], under the
name of lightweight groups. NAVTECH casts the hierarchy in the architecture, widening
the horizon for scalability. For example, several  modules may exist and map onto the
site  module. However, in each  module, genuine lightweight groups may further
be mapped on regular participant groups[35]. The two-tier membership is also compatible
with the separation of concerns between communication () and activity () pioneered
in the NAVTECH architecture. The same site membership semantics may serve different
participant membership semantics in the same system, according to the application needs.
For example, on the same view-synchronous site membership, a primary-partition database
replica management group and a designated partition[10] collaboration awareness group
may coexist.
The sticky membership idea emerged from the work in the BROADCAST project and was
followed by several systems designed in the project[5], including NAVTECH . The intuition
behind it was that in situations of instability, typical of large-scale settings, frequent group
changes would occur. However, most of those changes might be due to partitioning, and
quite a few of them (e.g. mobile environments) to temporary, short-lived crashes. In or-
der for the system to operate efficiently, two objectives should be sought: (a) the operation
during those glitches should adapt to the situation; (b) the cost of re-insertion should be
reduced.
Separating between membership, a long-lived status of group elements achieved by ex-
plicit registration, and view, the current state of a group defined by the reflexive relation of
“not detected failed”, proved useful to pursue those objectives. Examples of applications re-
lying on this duality can be found in [4, 10]. When members suddenly depart from groups,
because of crash or partitioning, they stick to the membership. However, the view is up-
dated to exclude them. This information is precious for dynamic adaptation algorithms, for
example, dynamic majority replica management. On the other hand, it eases the task of
merging and/or recovery of members, based on the analysis of the configuration of mem-
bership and view that occurs upon a re-join. The Site Membership module, 	 , handles
site failure detection/recovery on behalf of site-groups, inasmuch as Participant Member-
ship, 	 , handles participant failure detection/recovery on behalf of a participant group.
In consequence, from now on it should be clear that when we say “site 

detects 

as
failed” or “participant 

believes 

to be alive”, we mean the respective membership mod-
ules (based on failure detection information).
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6.1 Membership Definitions
Participants become senders or members of a group, 

 

 

 

 , or abandon it
respectively through join and leave operations. A group is defined by a tuple


 ' 	  .
The name of the group, '

, is the unique logical designation or logical address of the
group. The membership of the group, 	

  



	 

, is formed by the participants
that joined it asmembers. Note that participants that joined as senders (denoted by the symbol


 

) are thus treatedwith less overhead. The view of the group is formed by themembers
that are mutually believed to be alive,  

  



	 

 % 

. That is, for any


 

in the view, 

satisfies the relation %  
 not considered failed by 

   ,.
A site-group, 

 

 

 

 , is defined by a tuple 


 ' 	  . The name
' of the site-group is the same as the name of the group. The s-membership of a site-group


, is the set of sites hosting all participants having entered group 

, either as senders or
asmembers,	

  



(

 

 

 



	 

. The s-view of the site-group, is
formed only by the sites hosting members. The reason being that these are the recipient sites,
to be consistent with our unidirectional group model. Furthermore, the view only contains
the sites that are mutually believed to be alive,  

  



	 

 

(

 

	


 % 

. In the context of NAVTECH , ’alive’ for a site means “with connectivity”,
that is, for any 

 

 $  , in the s-view, 

satisfies the relation %  
 not considered
failed by 

.
By the sticky membership attribute, group and site-group membership survive failures
while there is at least one member alive, and they are only modified by explicit requests.
Group and site-group views are modified by unsolicited events, such as failure and recovery
detection.
6.2 Site Membership
Each time a participant joins a group, the relevant communication endpoint is opened at the
site level. The set of communication endpoints forms the site-group. The Site Membership
module, 	 , is concerned with the management of site-groups. Sites enter a site-group
by means of open or attach requests, depending on whether local users will receive or send
messages. This interface materializes the unidirectional group model of NAVTECH : the
return of an attach is a sending interface, the return of an open is a receiving interface;
whenever local participants of a group need both to send and receive, an open and an attach
are made to the same site-group.
Themain data structures of 	 , as shown in Figure 6, are the Site-GroupMembership, and
the Liveness Criteria. The Membership structure holds all site-group membership and views.
The Liveness Criteria structure is defined on a per-group basis, and holds the behavior def-
initions stipulated for failure detection in each site-group, for example, QoS specifications
(see Section 5.2). The 	 , based on the former parameters, instructs the  to run fail-
ure detection tests. A liveness criterion is defined when a site-group is created, but can be
modified during its operation.
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6.3 Participant Membership
The innovative issue that we stress again at this point, is the separation of site and par-
ticipant membership in NAVTECH . Participant membership concerns the genuine partic-
ipant groups, or just groups from now on. Its goal is to assist participants in working to-
gether, namely in forming groups and managing their activity. Site membership concerns
site-groups, which are a mapping of groups on the site structure, and its aim is to assist inter-
site communication on behalf of group participants. Both objectives have traditionally been
aggregated to the Group Membership Problem in the generality of other works [13, 23, 33].
The main data structures of a 	 , as shown in Figure 6, are the Group Membership, and
the Activity Criteria. The Group Membership structure holds the membership and views of
all groups. The Activity Criteria are defined on a per-group basis, when the group is created.
They establish the rules to follow when there is a change in the state of the group (due to
failures, joins or leaves), concerning the automatic control of the group’s activity by the 	 ,
relieving the application from that problem. NAVTECH allows the definition of criteria other
than the canonical primary partition membership.
The 	 modules handle participant failure detection, which can be provided by the
following means: participant failure detector ( ) report to the 	 on the failure of a
local participant; remote 	 report to peer 	s on the failure of a remote participant; site
membership (	 ) report to the 	 on the failure of a remote site— the reverse mapping is
made, and all the remote participants residing there are reported failed.
6.4 Membership in Action
In order to clarify our membership structure, we are going to highlight a few fundamental
aspects of its functionality. We start by doing an overview of the mapping between the 	
and 	 solicited actions of entering and leaving groups and site-groups, and explain what
is gained from a 2-tier, sticky membership structure:
 First participant join - the first participant to join a group at a site must create the commu-
nication endpoint for the corresponding site-group: it invokes an open (member), an attach
(sender), or an open+attach (sender/member), and in response it receives a receive or a send
endpoint, or both.
 Site-group open/attach - the site enters a communication group, performing the necessary
actions to stabilize and achieve consensus on the site-group membership and view including
the new site, accordingly to the chosen semantics (e.g. view synchrony); attach is supposedly
simpler than open.
 Sequel of first participant join and following joins - in the 2-tier membership, synchroniza-
tion of the participant’s entry and update of the membership and view to include the new-
comer, accordingly to the chosen semantics for this group, can be performed by merely having
the  use the communication channel to the group (e.g. an atomic multicast message will
ensure total order w.r.t. to messages exchanged in the group); a further advantage is that the
synchronization of further joins is as simple as increasing a counter of group users at the site,
and synchronizing the entry as above.
 Participant leave - the user counter is decreased, and the  synchronizes the departure with
the other group members, easing its removal from the membership and view; upon the last
local leave from that group, the site also leaves the corresponding site-group.
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 Site-group close/detach - the site leaves the site-group by signalling its departure to the other
member sites, so as to ease stabilization of the new site-group membership and view without
this site; the endpoint is closed.
Failure, Partitioning and Recovery
The power of the 2-tier structure with sticky membership is also evident upon the occurrence
of unsolicited actions, such as failures, recoveries, partitioning, and merging. We enumer-
ate below the actions triggered upon failure or recovery of sites and participants. Since a
participant or a site may either fail or be partitioned (vis. recover or merge) without the
distinction being evident at first sight, we use  and $ to denote either state, from a
detector’s perspective.
 Participant down -when a participant in the membership is down, it is removed from
the group view — $

	 

  

   

 

 Site down - when a site in the membership is down
it is removed from the site-group view — $

	 

  

   

 

 Site up - when a site in the membership is up again it is added to the view —


	 

  

   

  

 Participant up - when a participant in the membership is up again, it is added to the
view — 

	 

  

   

  

Because of the sticky membership and membership/view duality, when a site 

shows
up to an existing site-group 

, the information provided both by its structures for that
site-group (	

 and  

) and by the other sites’ structures (	

 and  

)
allow the identification of the site’s state and intention. Observe that in a system of uncertain
timeliness and prone to partitioning, sites may change their state with regard to a site-group,
even in the middle of a protocol execution, in the course of partitioning. For example, con-
sider site A has sent a message to site B and nowwaits for B’s acknowledgment. It may hap-
pen that the next time A hears about B, B and others that in the meantime had formed a vir-
tual partition excluding A, due to connectivity problems, are now coming back because con-
nectivity improved in the meantime: sites A and B have contradictory membership/view
information. However, as we show below in the table of Figure 8, NAVTECH provides useful
information for protocols to detect the actual situation of a site that shows up to an existing
site-group: cold start; reboot, with or without memory; merger; connected. This helps auto-
mate and modularize the site insertion protocols and procedures, in order to provide quick
reaction to attempts by sites to enter existing site-groups. As a matter of fact, this is as far
as we wish to go in the NAVTECH framework: leaving generic and well-defined hooks for
specific cold start, recovery and merging algorithms to be implemented.
Activity Criteria
With the notion of Activity Criteria, the NAVTECH framework provides a hook for the def-
inition of generic criteria to control activity of subgroups in the presence of partitioning.
These criteria may be different from the canonical example of primary partition, PP, and they
can vary from group to group.
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Type of Recovery Description
boot membership information about the site is non-existant


 








stateless reboot the site does not have membership information itself, but it appears in
the membership information of the other sites






  





  

 




stateful reboot the site has kept membership information in non-volatile storage, and
appears in the membership of the other sites






  

 



  





  

 




merger the site has its own membership information, and consistently appears
in the membership but not in the view of the other sites


 



 



  





  

 




connected when a site is fully connected, membership information about the site
is consistent everywhere


 



 



 



 




Figure 8: Identification of the state of a recovering site
The activity criterion of a group is defined as a boolean function of the membership and
view of the group, 

 	

  

. An Activity test, performed whenever a local
	 module handles a change in the group state, evaluates the function for a given pair
membership/view, and if it evaluates to false, activity is blocked for all participants at that
site.
An example function for the primary partition criterion is 


  

 - 	

"	, that
is, activity blocks for participants of group 

that find themselves in a minority partition,
since 

evaluates to false at the relevant 	 modules. This happens in this case because
upon partitioning, some sites formed a subgroup such that the view  

 does not reach
majority. However, there are a number of other, significant activity control criteria in real
world systems. For example, a minimum absolute threshold on the number of participants,



  

  ' , typical example of a manager of a distributed processor pool, where
' workers are assembled to perform a distributed parallel computation, and where despite
partitions or failures, what is relevant is that there are ' for each requested computation.
Several partitions may work in parallel in this case, provided there are at least ' partici-
pants. In cooperative applications, it is frequent to define an enumerated set of core named
participants without which the application cannot proceed (e.g. the moderator, the chair,
etc.)[10]. Suppose a virtual group decision meeting where in order to make progress in cer-
tain parts of the meeting, the moderator, plus at least three persons, must be present: such a
criterion would look like 


 

	  

  

 - .
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6.5 Two-tier Membership Skeleton Protocol
We now present the specification of a skeleton protocol that implements the membership
management functionality. In the framework spirit of this work, we identified several
generic functional modules materializing the steps we have just discussed, and organized
the skeleton around them. This way it is possible to implement new membership protocols
without having to re-invent modules that are common to most membership algorithms. In
the work of [23] several functional modules are provided so that they can be configured in a
number of possible ways. In comparison, our skeleton protocol adopts one such interaction
and configuration semantics, the 2-tier sticky membership structure, because of the advan-
tages in efficiency that we have just shown, namely for large-scale, uncertain synchrony
settings. However, it provides placeholders where modules such as those developed in [23]
can be re-used, so that different membership semantics can be implemented in NAVTECH .
The consolidated view of the transitions in membership is as given in the table of Fig-
ure 9. The symbol  denotes “added to”, whereas  denotes “withdrawn from”. As
for the algorithm, it is presented in Figures 10 and 10, and in general, it makes use of the
following notation: whenever the state of a group or site-group changes, a state variable

()**. .  is positioned; ** accounts for the module where the state change
is produced: 	 , 	 ,  or ; . . accounts for the structure concerned with the
change: group or site-group.
Event Action onMembership/View
participant join as member 



  


participant join as sender ——
participant leave 



  


site open 



  


site attach 




site close 



  


participant down 

  


site down 

  


site up 

  


participant up 

  


Figure 9: Membership and view change rules
Solicited Actions
The obvious solicited actions implemented by the skeleton membership protocol are join,
leave, open, attach, close, detach. They prefigure the membership functions for entering
and exiting groups and site-groups discussed in Section 6.4. If a request to join (lines 01
or 10) is the first at the site, it is necessary to enter the site-group first (lines 02 or 11), which
returns a receive or transmit handle for the group, depending on whether an open or an
attach are made, respectively. Depending on whether a participant joins as member or as
sender, a receive or a transmit handle are returned (lines 04 or 12). We leave the analysis of
leave, close and detach operations, to the reader.
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Synchronizing Group Views
The synchronizer protocol (synchronize(

   

)) synchronizes the members of group


to carry a change of state due to an action (join,leave,down,up) performed on 

in 

.
This may be done in several ways that we do not discuss here, according to the chosen
semantics (ordering, state transfer, etc.). For example, a totally ordered entry may be per-
formed simply by issuing an atomic multicast message to the group. When the function
returns, all members will have updated 	

 and  

, including 

, depending on the
action, as per Table 9.
// ** PM **
// ** solicited actions
01 when join(

,member) do
02 if  

then RXhandle=open(

) fi
03 synchronize(

 

)
04 return RXhandle
05 od
10 when join(

,sender) do
11 if  

then TXhandle=attach(

) fi
12 return TXhandle
13 od
15 when leave(

,member) do
16 synchronize(

 


)
17 if lastmember(

) then close(

) fi
18 od
20 when leave(

,sender) do
21 if lastsender(

) then detach(

) fi
22 od
// ** change events
25 when stateChangePM(

) do
26 if testActivity(

)
27 then action=unblock(

)
28 else action=block(

) fi
29 updateAT( 

 )
30 od
35 when stateChangePM(

) do
36 update(

)
37 od
// ** unsolicited actions
40 when stateChangePFD(

,	) do
41 if 

 

then
42 synchronize(

 	

) fi
43 od
// ** SM **
// ** solicited actions
50 when open(

) do
51 stabilize(

  

)
52 return RXhandle
53 od
55 when attach(

) do
56 stabilize(

  

)
57 return TXhandle
58 od
60 when close(

) do
61 stabilize(

 
 

)
62 od
65 when detach(

) do
66 stabilize(

  

)
67 od
// ** change events
70 when stateChangeSM(

) do
71 updateCT( 

)
72 od
// ** unsolicited actions
75 when stateChangeSFD(

,down) do
76 stabilize(

 )
77 od
80 when stateChangeSFD(

,up) do
81 stabilize(

 	)
82 od
Figure 10: Two-tier Membership Skeleton Protocol – PM and SM (For each 

at any 

,

)
Stabilizing Site-group Views
The stabilizer protocol (stabilize(

   

)) processes solicited actions that change the
state of a site-group. It stabilizes the outcome of solicited actions (open,attach,close,detach)
on 

in site-group 

. This is done according to the chosen semantics for managing site-
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group membership (e.g. flushing and view-synchrony or partial order, strong or weak par-
tial, etc.). For example, with view-synchronous semantics, the stabilizer takes care of flush-
ing all pending messages in the site-group, reach agreement among the site-groups on the
next membership and/or view, and install it everywhere. When the function returns, all
sites will have updated 	

 and/or  

, including 

, depending on the action, as
per the table in Figure 9. Attach is expected, in most implementations, to lead to simpler
actions, and it only implies the update of 	

.
The stabilizer also stabilizes the outcome of unsolicited actions (down,up) of 

in all the
site-groups that contain 

(stabilize(

  )). The function handles failures/recoveries
efficiently by returning results for all site-groups affected, as if invoked for one site-group. In
the particular case of recovery (up), the stabilizer protocol extracts information as described
in the table of Figure 8, to identify the type of recovery of the site for each site-group it
belongs to, and perform the adequate actions, as discussed in Section 6.4.
Testing Activity Criteria
Whenever the state of a group changes, for example in result of the synchronization func-
tions just described, a state variable 
()	

 is positioned (line 25). This triggers
the evaluation of the activity criterion for that group, that blocks or unblocks activity of this
group at this site, depending on whether it evaluates to false or not (lines 26-28). We made
these operations idempotent for simplicity. If blocked, all subsequent local requests to this
group are refused.
Updating the Taps
The information about site view changes must be propagated to the communication pro-
tocols. This is done through the Communications Tap (updateCT( 

)), which is the
hook to the data flow part to update the view of 

(lines 70-71). Likewise, group view
changes must be propagated to the activity protocols. This is done through the Activity Tap
(updateAT( 

  )), which besides to the update of the view, also does the blocking or
unblocking of 

( ), as a result of the activity test (line 30).
Detecting Failures
A participant failure detected locally must be disseminated to the rest of the group, with the
same synchronization semantics used for solicited operations (lines 40-42). The implemen-
tation of the synchronizer protocol should handle that. Subsequently to the change in view,
activity is tested and the  updated (lines 25-30).
A site failure entails the run of the stabilizer protocol over the whole domain, with the
aim of reaching fast agreement on the new view, at all sites (lines 75-76), for all site-groups
affected by the failure. When each of the concerned site-groups is detected as changed
(line 70), the  is updated.
Site failures and recoveries must be propagated to the 	 . Since this is normally re-
quired to be ordered with the data flow, it is done by propagating the information from
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the  (line 71) to the  through the data path. The arrival of the information to the 
causes a state change at the 	 (line 35) which is processed bymaking updates in the group
connected to the changed site-group (line 36).
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Figure 11: Propagation of failure information through the 2-tier membership structure
Recovering
When a recovering site is detected, the stabilizer protocol is run for recovery (lines 80-81),
in the domain, for the same reasons as for failure detection. However, recovery of sites
offers a number of opportunities for optimized protocols to be built. NAVTECH goes as far
as providing those protocols with information about the kind of recovery, see the table of
Figure 8. The stabilizer may be built so as to react differently, depending on whether it is
a: cold start; reboot, with or without memory; merger. In a cold start, nothing is done, the
site is allowed to go up, launch the applications, that will eventually open their groups. In a
reboot without memory, the site-groups may be activated automatically, and the application
is allowed to a warm restart with the communication channels already open. In a reboot
with memory, it is possible that the application may enjoy some stable storage backup and
do a warm restart with the support of the system. In a merger, the merging sites enter a
negotiation to recognize what is the correct merged state. After stabilization, the relevant
site-group views are changed:  is updated (line 71), and that information is propagated
up to the  . In consequence, when the  reports a site-group 

state change to the 	
(line 35), the relevant group 

is updated in consequence. Figure 11 exemplifies with a bit
mask example how efficient themanagement of failures and recoveries may be, if algorithms
take advantage from the propagation path through the 2-tier membership hierarchy.
7 The Data FlowModules
Remember that the membership and failure detection structure are the spinal cord of
NAVTECH . As depicted in Figure 6, the taps act on the data flow, performing filtering, mul-
tiplexing and demultiplexing functions, allowing to implement several known functionality
and consistency profiles.
At the Multipoint Network level, the bare semantics of the site failure detector  en-
forces an informal weak-partial membership in the best-effort multicast datagram commu-
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nication protocols. The hook is the Multicasting Tap. In this sense, several possibly overlap-
ping views may be formed in a system, namely in the presence of partitioning. Those views
reflect in the best manner possible the set of sites than are mutually reachable, but no further
guarantees are given. This is the support of the best-effort profile, where the informal views
are mainly supposed to assist multicast addressing and best-effort communication, as im-
plemented by the Multipoint Network. The best-effort profile can be connected to protocols
further up, but it bypasses all other tap filters up to the participant, as sketched in Figure 5.
This profile has been tested in a prototype of a partitionable cooperative application[10].
Note that NAVTECH combines two desirable but sometimes conflicting attributes: (a)
semantic guarantees (e.g. view-synchrony, primary-partition); (b) versatility (tap bypass,
group composability). From our past experience with group systems, we believe this was
made difficult for two reasons: the functionality of membership and failure detection was
mixed with communication; the structure of membership and failure detection was inter-
twined with the data flow protocols.
The first syndrome has been addressed in practically all recent groups systems, by sep-
arating the membership and failure detection functions from communication. However,
most of the current groups systems, although modular, still have membership stand ”in the
way” of the data flow. Suppose that site and participant membership would be inside of
or closely coupled to the  and  modules respectively: it might be difficult to reason
about the correctness of applications that would for example rely on some communication
protocols in , bypass the primary-partition semantics, and use again some protocols of
the  module, for example, session control and awareness in a CSCW application.
Now consider the same application in NAVTECH , and suppose it was a cooperative
computer supported application. The architect might define liveness criteria for the site
connectivity based on QoS information, and hook them to the Communications Tap. Then
he might define activity criteria based on alternative partition semantics, such as the social
roles of participants, and hook that to the Activity Tap. Then hewould connect the necessary
protocols at the different levels to configure the application communication and processing
needs, without worrying about consistency, ensured by the membership/failure detection
structure, through the tap hooks, which change at precise steps in the execution.
We now review the several data flow modules: Multipoint Network, Communications
Services, Activity Services, with emphasis on the Tap functionality.
The Multipoint Network
Sites are administratively registered in the Domain. Each local Site Failure Detector has a
view of the currently reachable sites in the Domain, theDomain View,

, kept in the Connec-
tivity Scratchpad, as was shown in Figure 6. As previously said, this viewmay be incomplete,
but must at least contain the set of all sites containing site-group members.
This view is updated by the failure detection protocols, and assists the addressing of the
low-level multicasting protocols, through the Multicasting Tap. The Domain may obviously
be very large, depending on the scale of the applications. In consequence, the scope of
inter-site communication for failure detection may be subdivided using the Facility-based
hierarchy. This topology awareness suits the protocol functionality, but is kept transparent
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to its semantics.
The Multipoint Network presents two classes of interfaces: LocalNet and GlobalNet, as
shown in Figure 6. The GlobalNet is the inter-Facility communication. A Facility resides
in a LocalNet. The LocalNet is the intra-Facility communication. NAVTECH is built on top
of current standard network architectures and protocols, for example, but not limited to:
bridged Ethernet for the LocalNet; the Internet for the GlobalNet.
The LocalNet and GlobalNet protocols are implemented on top of the relevant standard
protocol drivers, and traffic is routed to/from either by a dispatcher. The dotted lines in
the figure illustrate the data paths. A possible implementation of GlobalNet addressing is
through internet group addressing such as multicast-IP, addressing all the Agents of Facili-
ties holding addressed sites. A possible implementation of LocalNet addressing is through
physical group addressing, such as Ethernet multicast.
Communication Services
The Comunication Services module hosts the communication protocols and any other site-
related protocols (such as clock synchronization). The  is designed in order to be im-
plementable by any runtime environment that is modular enough to be stripped from site
membership, and in consequence be hooked downwards to the Communications Tap, as
a provider of the desired membership semantics. The runtime environment is hooked up-
wards to the dispatcher, which hides the fact that the  may be serving several Activity
Services modules, probably in different address spaces.
Figure 6 suggests the use of protocol composition in the implementation of
NAVTECH protocols. Although the architecture itself is not tied to a concrete protocol com-
position framework, its implementation should desirably rely on a run-time environment
that allows micro-protocols to be composed in a flexible way. Typical examples of such
frameworks are the -kernel[29], Horus [40], Ensemble [22], Coyote [6] and Appia[25]. The
lessons learned from these implementations motivated the development of a new composi-
tion framework[30]. This framework, called Appia[25], is currently being used to implement
an instantiation of the NAVTECH architecture to support intrusion-tolerance techniques[9].
The advantage of Appia over previous composition frameworks is that it allows different
communication channels, each with its own set of services, to be integrated in a coherent
multi-channel protocol stack. Appia recognizes the need to integrate channels, allowing
properties to be shared across several channels, a feature that is extremely useful in the
implementation of modular architectures.
Communication Tap
The 	 is hooked with the  module by the Communication Tap,  . The  acts as a
filter to enforce the 	 strategies, by controlling the communication flow:
 it diverts incoming protocol messages destined to the  , albeit preserving their order relative
to the data message flow;
 securing s-membership properties in the communication flow between site-group members;
 informing upper layers about site-group view changes;
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 blocking communication when necessary to enforce the group communication properties (e.g.
view-synchronous flush);
 by multiplexing/demultiplexing, the 	 also maps the communication flows of the several
site-groups onto the
 .
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Figure 12: Taps in action
The operation of the taps is exemplified in Figure 12. On the left (a), the normal oper-
ation, taps let the flow pass between the 	' and 	 . Next to the right (b), a change is
detected in the site level.  tap diverts the flow to the 	 module, for the change to be
processed and the new view stabilized by the 	 protocols (see Section 6.4), in complete
control of the desired semantics w.r.t. the data flow. The following picture (c) shows the re-
sult of the propagation of the update to the  tap: the tap diverts the flow through the 	
module, so that the resulting changes may be processed, by having them reflected in the par-
ticipant group view, and this view synchronized among all participants, with a controlled
semantics w.r.t. the data flow.
Activity Services
The Activity Services () host the algorithmic part of the distributed application support.
In terms of runtime, the considerations we made for the Communication Services apply as
well for . That is, the same kind of runtime environment can be re-instantiated for ,
hosting algorithms as modular as the communication protocols, as portrayed in Figure 6.
However, the function of  is supporting the execution of distributed applications, leaving
communication to . In consequence, this is the place for replication management, coor-
dination and cooperation algorithms. This modularity, and the fact that several  mod-
ules may be instantiated over the  module, leaves room for the deployment of different
middleware support susbsystems re-using the same communication services: fault-tolerant
toolboxes, CSCW platforms, etc.
36
Activity Tap
The 	 connects to the  module by the Activity Tap,  . The Activity tap establishes a
hook between participant membership (	 ) and activity management protocols (e.g. repli-
cation management, collaboration awareness). It also implements the desired semantics for
group membership, based on the underlying s-membership semantics. For example, view-
synchronous s-membership allows securing a linear membership at the participant level,
that is, one with a totally ordered history of views. With such a semantics, applications on
top may enjoy the properties characterizing the primary-partition profile, namely, based on
the majority criterion.
The  , as a filter, is the means of enforcing 	 -derived semantics, by inserting control
information in the correct places of the communication flow from/to the participants:
 securing membership properties in the flow of activity among participants;
 informing the participants about view changes;
 blocking or unblocking the activity flow according to the group activity criteria;
 by multiplexing/demultiplexing, the 	 also maps several participants onto a same group.
Program-controlled Failure Notification
In all previously known systems, the failure detector, besides being a crash-only detector, is
directly hooked to the group membership protocol. We introduced program-controlled failure
notification in NAVTECH , whereby the notification of the failure of 

may be prevented or
produced by the application upon the analysis of failure notifications (e.g. results of QoS
tests). This is possible when programming on top the best-effort profile, where the tradi-
tional chain  -	 is broken. The site failure detector reports directly up, as we can see in
Figure 5. The Tap filters are bipassed, and the membership services in this case, work on a
best effort basis, to maintain a notion of group whose semantics is directly controlled by the
application, or by adequate Activity Services, such as the NAVCOOP platform for support of
cooperative applications[10]. These services receive failure/recovery notifications, analyze
them, and decide whether and when to pass the notification to membership.
Note that letting high-level services (or even the application) gain control over failure
detection is a risky decision, probably only feasible because our failure detector does less
mistakes and provides richer information (QoS). Mistakes on account of environment insta-
bility are significantly lower with an analog decision criterion (QoS failure detection), and
some dampening (suspicion debouncing, partition healing).
QoS Adaptation
This crucial architectural feature was used by applications built on top of NAVTECH ’s best-
effort profile, to improve the accuracy of failure detection and avoid premature group ex-
clusions by performing QoS adaptation[10]: we did an on-line comparison of the decisions
of our QoS failure detector (QoS-FD) with those of a classical crash failure detector, in a test-
bed where the environment was degraded sporadically by fault injection, and indeed the
QoS-FD showed significantly more stable operation.
The way it works is as follows. Recall the process of QoS failure detection (Section 5.2):
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at the end of each epoch, each site has information about the connectivity to other sites.
Normally, in case of a failure, that is, when 

   after a test epoch, the site failure
detector ( ) should go on and pass the decision to the Site Membership (	 ) module,
which would automatically trigger a group change. However, remember that at the end of
each epoch, each process 

has thorough information provided by the QoS-FD about the
QoS of its connectivity with other sites, namely the values of all parameters and #

.
This information allows two possible outcomes: either the intended QoS-dependent
computation is not possible at this time, or at least involving the faulty site(s), and fail-
ure is then declared to the 	 ; or the application can fine-tune parameters, for example
by choosing which ones to relax when # shows insufficient QoS, and remain active, avoid
premature failure declaration. The level of demand of the QoS specification for the next
epochs is relaxed, and the group resorts to a degraded mode of operation, maintaining all
members. Likewise, when a parameter  holds with 
 coverage, the application may
tighten the specification. This game of tightening some and loosening others aims at the
final end-to-end goal, that of obtaining the best possible QoS.
8 Conclusions
Making few or no assumptions about the network infrastructure ensures high portability but
often yields disappointing performances. The successful design should capture the right bal-
ance between generality and performance. In the NAVTECH project, we experimented with
a global network model that we have called WAN-of-LANs. The model is simple and gen-
eral, and can be applied to most existing global infrastructures. Yet, it is powerful enough
to allow the protocol designer to exploit its hierarchical nature to improve the performance
or reliable communication protocols.
There are a few published protocols exploiting the innovative attributes of NAVTECH ,
namely topology and group model. For example, a lightweight group service[36] and a reli-
able remote group access protocol[37], both taking advantage from the sender/member and
site/participant duality of the group model, and benefit from the topology to have credi-
ble efficiency. Another protocol is a clock synchronization protocol based on an hierarchical
composition of a protocol tailored to broadcast LANs with a protocol that makes use of the
GPS architecture[45]. The fourth protocol is a causal order protocol that makes use of topol-
ogy information to reduce the size of information that needs to be stored and exchanged
to provide causal order delivery[38]. Finally, we refer the reader to a total order protocol
that dynamically adjusts the ordering algorithm as a function of the participant location in
the network topology[34]. All the solutions follow the general framework provided by the
NAVTECH architecture. The experience with these protocols reinforced our belief that the
model is appropriate to design efficient group-oriented systems for large-scale networks.
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